Beyond Morality: Developing a New Rhetorical Strategy for the Animal Rights Movement
In this article, author Maxim Fetissenko presents a critique of animal advocacy strategy focused on moral arguments, and offers possibilities for alternative approaches based on appealing to human self-interest. Using the slavery abolition and anti-apartheid movements as historical precedents, Fetissenko notes that such movements have always had a strong ethical / moral component, but their results were ultimately bolstered by the self-interest of others. Outlining examples of current animal advocacy campaigns, such as Proposition 2 in California, the author seeks to understand and analyze why certain strategies appeal more to the general public, and how they can be altered to get a better outcome for animal rights.
“Whatever we wish to call the movement to end the use of nonhuman animals,” states author Maxim Fetissenko at the beginning of his article on animal advocacy strategy, “we have to admit that most of its goals remain unrealized.” It may seem like a harsh statement at first blush, but his stance is based on a relatively clear-eyed view that if the goal of animal advocates is to eliminate, or at least greatly reduce, the amount of animals used and abused for human ends, there is still a great deal of work to be done. Fetissenko concedes that “the international animal rights movement has some reasons for optimism. The uses of nonhuman animals by humans and their effects seemed to be discussed publicly more in 2008 and 2009 than ever before, with major mainstream newspapers in the United States publishing reports and editorials on the subject.” Still, he contests that “as positive as these achievements are, they demonstrate a trend that does not bode well for the ultimate goal of the animal liberation movement—that is, elimination of all animal exploitation or, at the very least, the end of all uses of animals where the only justification is, ultimately, “we do this because we like it.””
The author notes that many of the “victories” that the animal advocacy movement claims (such as Proposition 2 in California) have come about by “legislating moral behavior of others, as long as those doing the legislating do not have to give up anything of value to them.” In other words, “as people are forced into new patterns of behavior, they slowly adjust their attitudes to reflect a new social reality; where behavioral changes are not imposed from without, old attitudes persist, no matter how strong moral arguments against the old beliefs and attitudes may seem to outside observers.” As a counterpoint to the legislative, incremental approach, Fetissenko offers the work of abolitionist philosophers like Gary Francione who argues that “it is impossible to come up with a coherent moral justification for consuming animal food products unless we are willing to accept ‘we like it’ as a sufficient justification for human behaviors that cause pain and suffering to others.” Still, where many advocates would rest on abolitionist ideas as the only consistent strategy, Fetissenko notes that “historical evidence supporting the thesis that ethics-based advocacy for more radical changes—the approach favored by Francione, Hall, and other critics of welfarism—is likely to be effective in achieving the abolitionist goal is equally scant.” From this position, he argues that the “key task” of animal advocates is to identify principles that hold more value than the desire to keep consuming animals for food, and so on. “If the issue of animal use can be framed using a value or principle that will, indeed, be viewed as more important by the target audience than its preference for animal foods,” he says, “rational persuasion will become possible.”
For Fetissenko, the two most obvious angles to consider in this alternative approach are the negative environmental impacts of factory farming and the positive health benefits of eating an omnivorous diet. Though such appeals have been a part of animal advocacy for years, the author’s hope is that they take on a more central role in campaigning, and serve as a backdoor to convincing the general public to adopt animal rights-like behaviors. “People can be convinced that a vegan diet is the right choice for their own well-being and, ultimately, survival. To accomplish this goal, activists have to tap into their audience’s self-interest, the ultimate first principle that requires no justification.”
Original Abstract:
This article offers a critique of the central role afforded to the rights/sentience-based moral argument in the rhetorical strategy of the animal rights movement since the 1970s. Though important for articulating the movement’s philosophy and recruiting new activists, this argument has limited persuasive appeal, as suggested by the common failure of liberation movements to achieve their goals through moral advocacy. A two-prong approach addressing human health and environmental effects of animal agriculture is offered both as a supplemental strategy for reaching audiences unaffected by the moral argument and as a critical means of strengthening that argument.