In a paper published on the Social Science Research Network, David Frank Shultz analyzes the possibility of extending legal protection to non-human great apes (orangutans, gorillas, chimpanzees, and bonobos) so that they fall within the category of ‘people’ under Canadian law. Considering the issue from several different perspectives – animal rights activism, a scientific and philosophical viewpoint, and a legal perspective – Schultz believes that there is sufficient legal room for a plausible claim for great apes to be included within this group. As the law on this point is currently indeterminate, the paper gives animal rights advocates valuable material for litigation of this issue to potentially enact significant social change.

In the discussion of animal personhood, the question of great ape personhood looms large over all others. Though we may have an ethical desire to see personhood attributed to non-human animals in general (and may enact this belief through our food choices and other activism), on a legal level it is likely more feasible to advocate for the personhood of great apes, based on our similarity to them in various ways. In this paper from the Social Science Research Network, David Frank Shultz uses various case studies of great apes currently in captivity, as well as legal and philosophical literature, to make a strong case for the personhood of great apes in Canada.

A successful argument of the claim that great apes are plausibly ‘people’ would mean that they benefit from the country’s s.7 Charter right to “life, liberty, and security of the person;” giving them a right to some degree of protection from abuse and detainment wherever the government involvement is sufficient to trigger the Charter right. In practice, this would most likely lead to changes to (or abolition of) the use of great apes in entertainment and research, and greater protection for their transport, all of which are significant issues facing great apes in Canada. The broader legal claim that great apes are ‘people’ generally (outside of the narrow Charter context) would also have legal implications under various international treaties.

Though the paper does not present conclusions leading to a legislative plan or a plan of legal attack, the research is valuable in the sense that it shows that such a legal challenge is not only possible, but plausible as well.

Original Abstract:
This paper analyzes the possibility of extending Charter protection to the non-human great apes (orangutans, gorillas, chimpanzees, and bonobos). It is argued that great apes are plausibly people under Canadian law who benefit from the s.7 Charter right to ‘life, liberty, and security of the person’. The law on this point (as many legal points) is argued to be indeterminate. The legal claim that great apes are people protected by the Charter is analyzed from several different perspectives. This paper begins from the perspective of animal rights activism, viewing litigation of this issue as a strategy for social change. It discusses why an activist would pursue this legal strategy, how such a challenge fits in with the broader animal rights movement, what activists should hope to achieve through this litigation, and where they should begin. The second section moves to a scientific and philosophical viewpoint in order to build an empirical and conceptual background for the arguments to follow. This section examines the general (non-legal) understandings of ‘person-hood’ and illustrates the psychological properties of the great apes that will be relevant to their Charter claim. The third section shifts to a legal perspective. The claim that great apes are people is considered narrowly in the Canadian legal context. The aim is not to show that the great apes are demonstrably people under the Charter, but only that there is sufficient legal room for a plausible claim for their inclusion into this group, thereby making space for activists to pursue such a challenge.