In this article, researchers make a strong case for chimpanzee autonomy. Spending most of the piece outlining a definition of autonomy itself, the authors prove that chimpanzees satisfy the basic definition and all of its essential conditions. Citing a variety of already-published research on chimp psychology, they show that acknowledging chimp autonomy is more or less a foregone conclusion if one were to view it from a non-speciesist perspective. The evidence has already been established, and can be easily combined to support the proposal of autonomy.

While a great deal of research has explored and attempted to explain the cognitive capacity of great apes, the question of chimpanzee autonomy has been virtually unasked and unanswered. Though part of this guardedness “derives from a lack of clarity about the meaning of ‘autonomy,'” skepticism about the level of apes’ cognitive capacity also plays a role. In this study, researchers wish to make an “intentionally provocative” foray into claiming that chimps do have autonomy. This is not done to build some type of “moral notion,” but simply to establish that autonomy in chimpanzees exists, which in and of itself is a radical notion. So what is autonomy? According to this research, “the starting point for a theory of autonomy is individual self-governance: self-rule free of controlling interferences by others and without limitations in the individual that prevent free and informed choice and action.”

This general scheme presumes that two conditions of autonomy are essential: (1) liberty (the absence of controlling influences) and (2) agency (self-initiated intentional action).” A great deal of chimpanzee research supports the assertion that they fit within this definition: “current evidence about [chimps’] forms of planning and acting indicates that they are capable of executing actions deliberately, and even doing so over lengthy time scales. […] Numerous experimental studies have established that chimpanzees discriminate intentional from accidental actions in observing others’ behavior.” Even though the authors noted before that their paper was not based in a moral premise, they do say that if chimpanzees can act autonomously and with intention it “raises moral questions about the justification of their use in research.” They note specifically the conclusions of report of the Committee on the Use of Chimpanzees in Biomedical and Behavioral Research of the Institute of Medicine (IOM), which states that in order for experiments with chimps to be ethical they must involve the chimps “acquiescing.”

If the evidence for chimps’ autonomy is already well documented, why is there still controversy? According to the researchers, it is because “many and perhaps all of the leading general theories of autonomy set the bar of autonomy too high — excluding not only the actions of nonhuman animals, but many human actions that clearly are autonomous.” They outline different examples of theories of autonomy, such as the Kantian view that “one has autonomy if and only if one knowingly gives to oneself universally valid moral principles and wills to act on them,” and add that “perhaps the most influential theory of personal autonomy, [is] that autonomy consists in the capacity to control and identify with one’s first-order desires or preferences by means of higher-level desires or preferences through processes of deliberation, reflection, or volition.” Though chimps certainly seem to meet a baseline of criteria for autonomy, there are more granular definitions with a decidedly higher bar for inclusion that seem to have the express purpose of excluding non-humans.

The authors of this study note that when it comes to recognizing chimp autonomy, it may simply be a matter of time before it becomes accepted knowledge: “we once had profound difficulty addressing a concept such as intention in psychology, but today, research comfortably investigates this dimension of the lives of chimpanzees. Even if neither evolutionary descent nor the physical and functional organization of animal systems gives us the depth of insight we would like to have in understanding mental states, we can expect new knowledge to mount at an unprecedented rate in upcoming years.” What they hope to have established with their paper is that, even if there isn’t unanimous agreement at the moment, they have provided a “credible basis” for further inquiry. “Even if the human animal is, on average, at a far higher level of autonomy, some measure of autonomy can be gained or lost over time by both humans and chimpanzees.” And they add, “if our arguments are sound, some chimpanzees will be at a higher level than some humans.”

Original Abstract:
Literature on the mental capacities and cognitive mechanisms of the great apes has been silent about whether they can act autonomously. This paper provides a philosophical theory of autonomy supported by psychological studies of the cognitive mechanisms that underlie chimpanzee behavior to argue that chimpanzees can act autonomously even though their psychological mechanisms differ from those of humans. Chimpanzees satisfy the two basic conditions of autonomy: (1) liberty (the absence of controlling influences) and (2) agency (self-initiated intentional action), each of which is specified here in terms of conditions of understanding, intention, and self-control. In this account, chimpanzees make knowledge-based choices reflecting a richly information-based and socially sophisticated understanding of the world. Finally, two major theories of autonomy (Kantian theory and two-level theory) are rejected as too narrow to adequately address these issues, necessitating the modifications made in the present approach.